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HEADS I WIN, TAILS YOU LOSE: THE TAXING RISK WHEN 
INVOKING THE FIFTH AMENDMENT ON A TAX RETURN 
Jacob Hoback* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Every calendar year includes fun holidays, such as Christmas, 
Valentine’s Day, and Independence Day. But not all famous dates of 
the calendar year are affiliated with the same joy as other holidays. On 
April 15th, taxpayers must file their tax returns with the Internal 
Revenue Service.1 Due to the complexity and cost of filing taxes, Tax 
Day is not a day that many citizens celebrate.2 In 2018, the average 
American family paid $15,748 in taxes.3 Further, taxpayers almost 
unanimously agree that the U.S. tax system is too complicated.4 
Therefore, in both cost and practice, Tax Day is an onerous day for 
citizens. 
An already unfavorable holiday is even more burdensome for 
taxpayers who have acquired income through illegal activity. When 
taxpayers report their gross income, they must include illegally-earned 
income.5 Additionally, they must disclose the income’s nature and 
source.6 As a result, the government can use that specific information 
to prove that a taxpayer engaged in illegal activity and is thus 
criminally liable.7 Nevertheless, taxpayers may invoke the Fifth 
Amendment8 on their tax returns to protect themselves from 
 
* Associate Member, 2020-21, University of Cincinnati Law Review. For inspiring me to study tax on a 
deeper level and her profound help with this Note, I thank Professor of Law Stephanie Hunter McMahon. 
Additionally, I would like to thank the wonderful Law Review editors, my dear friends, and other helpful 
professors. Finally, I would like to thank my family for believing in me, even when I did not believe in 
myself. All remaining errors are mine alone. 
 1. 26 U.S.C § 6072(a) (2020). 
 2. Unless, of course, they received a significant refund.  
 3. HOW MUCH DOES THE AVERAGE AMERICAN FAMILY PAY IN TAXES?, USA FACTS (Sept. 28, 2020, 
11:35 AM), https://usafacts.org/articles/average-taxes-paid-income-payroll-government-transfers-2018/ 
[https://perma.cc/HP3Q-XCQP]. 
 4. Why are taxes so complicated?, TAX POL’Y CENTER, 
https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/why-are-taxes-so-
complicated#:~:text=POLITICS%20OF%20TAX%20POLICY,sources%20and%20uses%20of%20inco
me.  [https://perma.cc/98XD-NGA7] (last visited Nov. 30, 2020). 
 5. James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213, 218 (1961) (“[U]nlawful, as well as lawful, gains are 
comprehended within the term ‘gross income.’”). 
 6. Richard B. Stanley, Comments: Conflict Between the Internal Revenue Code and the Fifth 
Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 15 U. BALT. L. REV. 527, 551 (1986). 
 7. See, e.g., Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648 (1976). 
 8. “Fifth Amendment” in this Article will refer exclusively to the privilege from self-
incrimination. The use of “Fifth Amendment” does not include the other securities therein, such as the 
right to due process. 
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prosecution by not disclosing the incriminating information.9 But this 
protection is not sufficient, because if a court holds that a taxpayer’s 
Fifth Amendment claim is not valid, the government can prosecute the 
taxpayer under federal law for tax evasion, specifically for not 
providing the information necessary to calculate tax liability.10  
To provide taxpayers with the full protection of the Fifth 
Amendment, the government should offer taxpayers precompliance 
review. Precompliance review is an opportunity to have a neutral 
decisionmaker review the validity of an individual’s Fifth Amendment 
claim before the individual would face penalties for tax evasion.11 
Under the law today, when taxpayers invoke the Fifth Amendment on 
their tax returns, the IRS can sue the taxpayers for not disclosing the 
particular information on their tax returns necessary to calculate tax 
liability and will prevail if the court finds that their claims are invalid.12 
On the other hand, however, offering precompliance review would 
allow taxpayers to receive a preliminary judicial ruling on the validity 
of their claims before facing penalties for failing to comply. 
Consequently, taxpayers would know whether their claims would 
prevail and not have to face federal tax evasion charges for invalid 
claims made in good faith. To be clear, this Note does not argue that 
taxpayers should be excused from paying taxes on illegally-earned 
income. Even if a taxpayer does have a valid claim of Fifth 
Amendment privilege, the taxpayer should still face tax liability, but 
the taxpayer should not have to disclose the specific incriminating 
information.13 
Taxpayers should not have to risk federal prosecution for tax 
evasion to invoke constitutional protection. Therefore, this Note 
argues that taxpayers who invoke the Fifth Amendment should be 
entitled to an opportunity for precompliance review. First, Section II 
presents the background of Fifth Amendment jurisprudence generally 
and as applied to tax returns. Next, Section III explains what 
precompliance review is and how the government offers 
precompliance review in other areas of the law. Finally, Section IV 
discusses why the government should afford taxpayers with an 
 
 9. United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259, 263 (1926). To be clear, under Sullivan, taxpayers 
would still have to provide the relevant, non-incriminating information. See Stanley, supra note 6, at 558. 
 10. Garner, 424 U.S. at 663; 26 U.S.C. § 7203 (2020). 
 11. City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 576 U.S. 409, 421 (2015). 
 12. Garner, 424 U.S. at 663; 26 U.S.C. § 7203 (2020). 
 13. See Stanley, supra note 6, at 558. (“A taxpayer must prepare a return, or make a similar 
calculation, to determine the exact amount of his annual liability. The filing of the return with the final 
tax payment is, of course, unnecessary for the IRS to receive the tax payment. The government's power 
to collect tax, therefore, does not require the filing of an income tax return from individuals who are 
incriminated by filing.”). 
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opportunity for precompliance review. 
II. BACKGROUND 
The requirement for taxpayers to report their illegally-earned 
income has raised Fifth Amendment self-incrimination concerns. The 
Fifth Amendment of the Constitution provides that “[n]o person . . . 
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself.”14 An individual faces the risk of self-incrimination when the 
government forces the individual to provide information that “would 
furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute the 
[individual].”15 Consequently, taxpayers have argued that reporting 
their illegally-earned income would allow the government to use the 
tax returns as a chain of evidence to obtain a conviction.16  
This Section describes the evolution of the Court’s application of 
Fifth Amendment protection, both generally and with respect to tax 
returns. First, Part A explains general, basic Fifth Amendment 
jurisprudence. Second, Part B explains how the Court has applied the 
Fifth Amendment to tax returns. 
A. The Fifth Amendment 
The Fifth Amendment of the Constitution provides that “[n]o 
person…shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness 
against himself.”17 Importantly, the Founders added the Bill of Rights 
to the Constitution “in the conviction that too high a price may be paid 
even for the unhampered enforcement of the criminal law.”18 The self-
incrimination clause in the Fifth Amendment comes from the cry of 
British citizens protesting their government, “No one is bound to 
accuse himself.”19 The protest was a response to the government’s 
unjust methods of interrogating alleged criminals in England.20 As a 
result of the protests, the English courts established a freedom from 
self-incrimination.21 Accordingly, there was no formalized British rule 
established by Parliament.22 Ultimately, the privilege against self-
 
 14. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 15. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951) (citing Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 
159, 161 (1950)). 
 16. See infra Part B. 
 17. U.S. CONST. amend V. 
 18. Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 486-87 (quoting Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487, 489 (1944)). 
 19. Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 596 (1896). 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 596-97. 
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incrimination became such a significant part of British criminal 
procedure that it is included in the U.S. Constitution.23 
The Supreme Court has applied the Fifth Amendment broadly. For 
example, the Fifth Amendment does not just protect citizens from 
disclosures that would directly support a conviction. The Fifth 
Amendment protects citizens against disclosures that “would furnish a 
link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute the claimant.”24 
Importantly, to wield its protection defendants must immediately 
claim the privilege, otherwise they effectively waive the privilege.25 
Also, for a court to protect a defendant’s privilege from self-
incrimination, the defendant’s apprehension of conviction must be 
“real and appreciable.”26 Finally, if a defendant has voluntarily 
revealed self-incriminating facts to the government, the defendant 
cannot invoke the privilege to avoid disclosing further specific 
details.27 
B. The Fifth Amendment as Applied to Tax Returns 
The requirement for taxpayers to report illegally-earned income has 
been subject to Fifth Amendment litigation. When taxpayers prepare 
their tax returns, taxpayers must first determine their gross income.28 
Gross income includes income from illegal activities.29 Therefore, 
taxpayers who earn income from illegal activity face a “cruel 
trilemma.”30 If they file their tax returns accurately, they tacitly admit 
that they committed a crime by identifying the nature or source of the 
income; if they file their tax returns inaccurately, they commit perjury; 
and if they fail to file their tax returns, they commit tax evasion.31 In 
certain situations, taxpayers still report their illegally-earned income 
despite the likelihood of prosecution.32 For example, some taxpayers 
who fear that they will inevitably be convicted report their illegally-
earned income “to avoid getting charged twice: once for their initial 
 
 23. Id. at 597; U.S. CONST. amend V. 
 24. Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 486 (citing Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 159, 161 (1950)). 
 25. Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 371 (1951) (quoting United States v. Murdock, 284 
U.S. 141, 148 (1943)). 
 26. Brown, 161 U.S. at 599. 
 27. Rogers, 340 U.S. at 373. 
 28. How to File Your Federal Taxes, USAGOV, https://www.usa.gov/file-taxes 
[https://perma.cc/U4TF-CLS7] (last visited Nov. 30, 2020). 
 29. See James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213, 218 (1961). 
 30. United States v. Egan, 459 F.2d 997, 997 (2d Cir. 1972). 
 31. Id. at 997-98. 
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crime, and again for evading the taxes on their windfall.”33 
Consequently, ever since the genesis of federal income tax, taxpayers 
have invoked the Fifth Amendment to preclude them from 
incriminating themselves.34 
The Court’s approach to applying the Fifth Amendment to tax 
returns has significantly evolved. Interestingly, income tax is relatively 
new to the United States, having existed for just over a century.35 
Therefore, the law is still developing. This Part analyzes the evolution 
of the Court’s handling of Fifth Amendment tax return cases.  
1. United States v. Sullivan 
Even if a taxpayer has a valid claim of Fifth Amendment privilege, 
the taxpayer must still file a tax return.36 Just eleven years after the 
government began requiring taxpayers to pay taxes on illegal income, 
a taxpayer claimed Fifth Amendment protection and did not file his tax 
return.37 In Sullivan, the taxpayer earned income through illegal liquor 
trafficking; therefore, he had to report his earnings to the 
government.38 Because he feared that reporting income through his 
illegal activity would incriminate him, he did not file a tax return.39 
Consequently, his refusal to complete his tax return made him subject 
to prosecution under the Revenue Act of 1921.40 He contended, 
however, that if he submitted his tax return accurately, he would 
effectively be self-incriminating himself because his business was in 
violation of the National Prohibition Act.41 Justice Holmes, writing for 
a unanimous Court, held that the plea for Fifth Amendment protection 
“was pressed too far,” because while the taxpayer could have invoked 
a valid claim of Fifth Amendment privilege on his tax return, he could 
not simply refuse to file a return at all.42 Therefore, under Sullivan, a 
taxpayer can, in theory, successfully invoke the Fifth Amendment, but 
the taxpayer must do so on the tax return.43 
 
 33. Id. 
 34. See infra Subsections 1-6. 
 35. In 1913, Congress ratified the Sixteenth Amendment which gave Congress the “power to lay 
and collect taxes on incomes.” U.S. CONST. amend. XVI. 
 36. United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259, 263 (1927).  
 37. Id. at 262-63. 
 38. Id. at 263. 
 39. Id. at 262. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 263. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
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2. United States v. Kahriger 
Similar to tax returns, the requirement for an illegal gambler to 
register for an occupational tax was also the subject of Fifth 
Amendment litigation.44 In 1951, Congress levied a tax on citizens 
who earned revenue from the illegal business of accepting wagers.45 
Congress also required taxpayers in the business of accepting wagers 
to register with the Collector of Internal Revenue.46  In Kahriger, the 
taxpayer engaged in illegal gambling and was therefore required to 
register as an illegal gambler.47 Nevertheless, the taxpayer refused, and 
the government brought charges against him.48 In response, the 
taxpayer fought the charges, arguing that if he registered as a gambler, 
he would effectively be providing the basis for the government to 
obtain his conviction.49  
The Court found the occupational tax constitutional.50 It reasoned 
that a taxpayer registering for the occupational tax as an illegal 
gambler does not indicate that the taxpayer had violated the law; 
instead, the taxpayer is merely completing a condition required to 
engage in the business.51 In other words, although registering for the 
occupational tax might indicate a clear intent to violate the law, it does 
not guarantee that the taxpayer would do so.52 Therefore, under 
Kahriger, the Fifth Amendment does not prohibit the government from 
requiring taxpayers to disclose what they might do; instead, the Fifth 
Amendment only prohibits the government from requiring taxpayers 
to disclose what they had done illegally in the past.53 
3. Lewis v. United States 
The Court reaffirmed its holding in Kahriger only two years later in 
Lewis v. United States.54 Writing for a divided Court, Justice Minton 
reaffirmed that requiring a gambler to register with the Collector of 
 
 44. United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22 (1953). Although the next few cases are about 
registering for an occupational tax, they are still applied when analyzing Fifth Amendment claims on tax 
returns. See, e.g., Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 659 n.13 (1976) (citing Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22 
(1953)). 
 45. Kahriger, 345 U.S. at 23. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 24. 
 50. Id. at 32. 
 51. Id. at 32-33. 
 52. Id. at 32. 
 53. Id. at 32-33. 
 54. 348 U.S. 419 (1955). 
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Internal Revenue was not a violation of a taxpayer’s freedom from 
self-incrimination.55 In Lewis v. United States, the government 
convicted the taxpayer for engaging in illegal gambling without 
registering for the occupational tax.56 The taxpayer faced the same 
dilemma as the taxpayer in Kahriger: if he registered for the 
occupational tax, it could lead to his conviction.57 Consequently, he 
did not register for the tax, arguing that the occupational tax violated 
his freedom from self-incrimination.58 Importantly, the taxpayer did 
not argue that the Fifth Amendment applied prospectively, but rather 
that the occupational tax was de facto retrospective.59 In other words, 
to pay the occupational tax, the taxpayer would have already had to 
have made an illegal wager.60 Nevertheless, the Court ultimately 
rejected the taxpayer’s argument.61 It applied a strict reading of the text 
and concluded that, although unlikely, one could have never accepted 
a wager and still register for the occupational tax.62 
Justice Black took a more pragmatic approach in his dissent.63 
Justice Black gave an overview of what taxpayers would have to do to 
comply with the statute.64 First, taxpayers would have to register with 
the Collector of Internal Revenue, revealing that they engaged in the 
business of wagering in violation of federal law.65 Further, taxpayers 
would have to specify where they conducted their business and the 
names and addresses of those with whom they worked.66 Therefore, 
those requirements, Justice Black argued, were sufficient to convict a 
taxpayer under federal anti-wagering laws and were therefore 
unconstitutional.67 
4. Marchetti v. United States 
After a third challenge, the Court ultimately found the occupational 
tax unconstitutional.68 Fifteen years after Lewis, the Court overruled 
 
 55. Id. at 422. 
 56. Id. at 420. 
 57. See supra note 44. 
 58. Kahriger, 345 U.S. at 421. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 422. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 424 (Black, J., dissenting). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 425. 
 68. Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 53 (1968). 
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both Kahriger and Lewis in Marchetti v. United States.69 Like the 
taxpayers in Kahriger and Lewis, the taxpayer in Marchetti was 
convicted for refusing to comply with the occupational tax.70 The 
Court found Kahriger and Lewis erroneous in two respects.71 First, the 
Court reasoned that registration would increase the likelihood that past 
or present wagering offenses would be discovered and prosecuted.72 
Second, the Court rejected the presupposition in Kahriger and Lewis 
that the self-incrimination privilege is not applicable to prospective 
acts since there is no basis for such a “rigorous . . . constraint upon the 
constitutional privilege.”73 
The Marchetti Court applied a different analysis from its progeny to 
reach its conclusion.74 First, the Court reexamined the standard for 
application of the self-incrimination privilege—that the taxpayer must 
be confronted by “‘real,’ and not merely trifling or imaginary, hazards 
of incrimination.”75 Next, the Court found that the hazards of 
incrimination created by the occupational tax were neither trifling nor 
imaginary since taxpayers could reasonably fear that completing the 
registration would increase their likelihood of prosecution for future 
acts and would substantially aid in facilitating their convictions.76 
Therefore, the Court concluded that the standard does not permit “the 
rigid chronological distinction adopted in Kahriger and Lewis.”77 
Consequently, the Court overruled Kahriger and Lewis. 
5. Leary v. United States 
The Court’s decision in Marchetti proved beneficial for taxpayers. 
Just one year later in Leary v. United States, a taxpayer used Marchetti 
as a defense to avoid complying with a different occupational tax 
statute.78 The statute in Leary subjected all persons engaging in 
business in the marijuana industry to an occupational tax, and taxpayer 
argued that, like registering for the occupational tax in Marchetti, the 
fear of self-incrimination in his case was “real and appreciable.”79 The 
Court accepted the taxpayer’s argument, echoing Marchetti that the 
 
 69. Id. at 54. 
 70. Id. at 40-41. 
 71. Id. at 52. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 53. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. (quoting Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 371 (1951)). 
 76. Id. at 54. 
 77. Id. at 53. 
 78. 395 U.S. 6 (1969).  
 79. Id. at 13, 14 (quoting Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 48).  
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taxpayer “had ample reason to fear that transmittal to [the government] 
of the fact that he was a recent, unregistered transferee of marihuana 
‘surely provide a significant link in a chain of evidence tending to 
establish his guilt.’”80 
6. United States v. Doe 
 In the most recent Supreme Court case about Fifth Amendment 
protection of financial records, the Court made an important 
distinction about when revealed information is considered 
compelled.81 In Doe, the taxpayer was the owner of several sole 
proprietorships. In the 1980s, a grand jury issued five subpoenas for 
his financial records, including his tax returns, in the midst of an 
investigation of corruption in the awarding of county and municipal 
contracts.82 
The Court found that preparing business records is voluntary, and 
therefore, there was no compulsion.83 After all, the subpoena did not 
require the taxpayer to affirm the accuracy of the records.84 
Nevertheless, the Court did acknowledge that that while the substance 
of a tax record may not be protected, the act of producing it may be, 
explaining that, “[c]ompliance with [a] subpoena tacitly concedes the 
existence of the papers demanded and their possession or control by 
the taxpayer. It also would indicate the taxpayer's belief that the papers 
are those described in the subpoena.”85 Therefore, the Court held that 
the act of production could have had substantial testimonial value and 
therefore remanded the case to the district court to consider whether 
the evidence should have been precluded.86 
Thus, the Court’s approach has evolved since Sullivan. Under the 
law today, a taxpayer can invoke Fifth Amendment protection when 
there is a reasonable apprehension that the information on the tax 
return could substantially aid the government in obtaining a 
conviction. 
III. PRECOMPLIANCE REVIEW 
A taxpayer’s decision to invoke the Fifth Amendment is not always 
 
 80. Id. at 16 (quoting Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 48). 
 81. United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (1984). 
 82. Id. at 606. 
 83. Id. at 610. 
 84. Id. at 612. 
 85. Id. at 613 (quoting Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118, 125 (1957)). 
 86. Id. at 616-17. 
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straightforward. When taxpayers wish to claim Fifth Amendment 
protection, they must first decide whether claiming the privilege is 
worth the ramifications of an unsuccessful claim. This dilemma is 
unique to taxpayers because when a citizen wishes to invoke 
constitutional protection in other contexts, an opportunity exists that is 
not afforded to taxpayers: precompliance review. Precompliance 
review is an opportunity to have a neutral decisionmaker review the 
validity of an individual’s claim before the individual would face 
penalties for noncompliance.87 Under precompliance review, citizens 
who wish to invoke constitutional protection can have their claims 
tested in court before suffering the consequences of refusing to comply 
with the government if a court found that their claims were invalid.88 
Consequently, citizens who receive precompliance review do not need 
to risk the penalty of asserting an invalid claim of constitutional 
privilege. 
This Section provides an overview of situations where citizens are 
afforded an opportunity for precompliance review and why the Court 
held that precompliance review was not constitutionally required for 
taxpayers. First, Part A explains how a witness in a judicial proceeding 
wishing to invoke Fifth Amendment protection is afforded 
precompliance review. Second, Part B explains how a citizen wishing 
to invoke Fourth Amendment protection is entitled to precompliance 
review. Next, Part C explains how taxpayers are afforded 
precompliance review from the IRS when they want to verify that they 
are complying with the Internal Revenue Code (“IRC”). Finally, Part 
D explains why the Court held that this opportunity was not 
constitutionally required for taxpayers who invoke the Fifth 
Amendment. 
A. Maness v. Meyers 
A witness contemplating a claim of privilege in a judicial 
proceeding has the opportunity for precompliance review.89 In Maness 
v. Meyers, an attorney appealed a contempt ruling for advising a store 
owner to not comply with a subpoena that demanded the store owner 
to turn over illegal magazines.90 After approval from his client, the 
attorney moved to quash the subpoena, arguing that the subpoena 
required his client to incriminate himself.91 
 
 87. City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 576 U.S. 409, 421 (2015). 
 88. See generally Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 663 (1976). 
 89. Id. 
 90. 419 U.S. 449, 450, 457 (1975). 
 91. Id. at 451. 
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The Court held that judicial witnesses are entitled to precompliance 
review.92 First, the Court affirmed the maxim that lawyers generally 
must encourage their clients to comply with court orders.93 
Nevertheless, the Court clarified that orders requiring witnesses to 
reveal information that could incriminate them are different, because 
if a witness complies with an incriminating order, the court cannot 
“unring the bell” after the information has been released.94 Therefore, 
the Court reasoned that precompliance review is necessary to protect 
an individual from compulsion to produce evidence that could 
incriminate the individual.95 Further, the Court explained that without 
precompliance review, the defendant would be compelled to surrender 
“the very protection which the privilege is designed to guarantee.”96 
B. City of Los Angeles v. Patel 
Citizens who want to claim Fourth Amendment protection are also 
entitled to precompliance review.97 In Patel, Los Angeles City Code 
required hotel operators to record information about their guests to 
help track criminals.98 The City Code also required hotel operators to 
present their records to the police department upon an investigation.99 
In 2003, several hotel operators sued the City of Los Angeles 
challenging the constitutionality of the provisions under the Fourth 
Amendment.100 
Writing for a divided Court, Justice Sotomayor ruled the statute 
unconstitutional because it did not afford hotel operators an 
opportunity for precompliance review.101 The Court reasoned that 
before suffering the consequences for not complying with a search, 
citizens should be able to question the search’s reasonableness.102 
Under the statute, a hotel owner who refused to allow a search could 
be arrested on the spot, and the Court concluded that the government 
could not reasonably subject citizens to that kind of choice—whether 
to invoke protection and risk prosecution for noncompliance or comply 
 
 92. Id. at 462. 
 93. Id. at 459-60. 
 94. Id. at 460. 
 95. Id. at 461. 
 96. Id. at 462 (quoting Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951)). 
 97. City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 576 U.S. 409, 413 (2015). 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 419. 
 102. Id. at 420 (quoting Donovan v. Lone Steer, 464 U.S. 408, 415 (1984)). 
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to what could be an unreasonable search.103 Further, the Court 
explained that the statute created an “intolerable risk,” leading to 
targeted harassment and oppression of citizens.104 
C. Private Letter Rulings 
Preliminary rulings are not foreign to the tax world. If a taxpayer 
wants guidance from the IRS about the tax consequences of a 
transaction, the taxpayer can request a private letter ruling (“PLR”). A 
PLR is “a written statement issued to a taxpayer that interprets and 
applies tax laws to the taxpayer’s represented set of facts.”105  
PLRs are different from judicial opinions, but they function 
similarly. First, PLRs do not come from the judiciary but rather from 
the executive branch. Nevertheless, the IRS’s role in a PLR is similar 
to that of a judge—apply the law to a unique set of facts. Second, PLRs 
are only applicable to the taxpayers who request them.106 In other 
words, taxpayers can only rely on the PLRs that they individually 
request.107 Therefore, even a taxpayer with identical facts could not 
rely on another taxpayer’s PLR, because the IRS is not bound by any 
prior PLR.108 Nevertheless, a taxpayer could still use a PLR from 
another taxpayer as persuasive authority.109 Further, in the interests of 
fairness, it is unlikely that the IRS would capriciously rule differently 
for taxpayers in different situations. 
PLRs are well-regarded within the tax community. Tax scholars 
have lauded tax rulings due to their “broad impact on [the] national 
economy and on proper and reasonable tax administration.”110 Also, 
PLRs benefit taxpayers by guiding them to decisions that will 
ultimately avoid litigation with the IRS.111 Not only do PLRs benefit 
the taxpayer, but they also benefit the IRS, because avoiding litigation 
is likewise beneficial to the IRS.112 Further, PLRs elicit compliance by 
 
 103. Id. at 421. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Tax Exempt Bonds Private Letter Rulings: Some Basic Concepts, I.R.S., 
https://bit.ly/31noOYL [https://perma.cc/S9AH-YH2U] (last visited Nov. 30, 2020). 
 106. Stephanie Hunter McMahon, Classifying Tax Guidance According to End Users, 73 TAX LAW. 
245, 261 (2020). 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 261-62, 
 109. Id. at 262. 
 110. Mitchell Rogovin & Donald L. Korb, The Four R’s Revisited: Regulations, Rulings, Reliance, 
and Retroactivity in the 21st Century: A View from Within, 46 DUQ. L. REV. 324, 344 (2008); See also 
Joshua D. Blank, The Timing of Tax Transparency, 90 S. CAL. L. REV 449 (2017). 
 111. Id.   
 112. Id. 
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guiding taxpayers through complex issues.113  
Overall, while PLRs are different from judicial rulings, PLRs serve 
the same purpose as precompliance review—to allow taxpayers test 
the legality of their tax decisions to mitigate prosecution for 
noncompliance with the IRC. 
D. Precompliance Review of Fifth Amendment Claims on Tax 
Returns 
Taxpayers who do not disclose all information that is required on a 
tax return violate 26 U.S.C. § 7203 (“Section 7203”). Section 7203 
prohibits taxpayers from “willfully” failing to provide all applicable 
information on their tax returns.114 While taxpayers can prevail on 
valid Fifth Amendment claims, the government can prosecute 
taxpayers under Section 7203 who raise invalid claims.115 In other 
words, if a taxpayer’s apprehension of reporting the amount, nature, or 
source of illegally-earned income on a tax return was not “real and 
appreciable,” the government could prosecute the taxpayer under 
Section 7203.116 
Despite the opportunities for precompliance review in other 
contexts, the government does not extend precompliance review to 
taxpayers who invoke the Fifth Amendment. In Garner v. United 
States, the government indicted Roy Garner for engaging in a 
gambling conspiracy.117 At trial, the government introduced 
supporting evidence from Garner’s tax returns where Garner labeled 
himself as a professional gambler.118 Garner argued, however, that the 
government could not use his tax return against him under the Fifth 
Amendment, but the district court rejected his argument, holding that 
by providing the information on his tax returns, Garner waived his 
Fifth Amendment rights.119 Consequently, the jury found Garner 
guilty.120 In response, Garner appealed, contending that he could not 
 
 113. Id. at 374. (“The Service and the Office of Chief Counsel believe that a key to furthering 
compliance with the tax law is helping taxpayers to understand the law and to perceive that the [IRS] is 
fairly and uniformly administering the [IRC].”). 
 114. 26 U.S.C. § 7203 (2020). (“Any person required under this title to pay any estimated. . .who 
willfully fails to pay such estimated tax or tax, make such return, keep such records, or supply such 
information, at the time or times required by law or regulations, shall, in addition to other penalties 
provided by law, be guilty. . .”). 
 115. Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 662 (1976). 
 116. An individual does not have a valid Fifth Amendment claim if the apprehension is not “real 
and appreciable.” See supra pp. 3-4. 
 117. 424 U.S. at 649. 
 118. Id. at 649-50. 
 119. Id. at 657. 
 120. Id. at 650. 
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have waived Fifth Amendment protection since the government 
compelled him to provide the information and that, like a witness in a 
judicial proceeding, he should have been afforded precompliance 
review.121  
The Court did not agree.122 Instead, it reasoned that taxpayers are 
not compelled to make the disclosures because taxpayers have a “free 
choice to admit, to deny, or refuse to answer” when filing their 
returns.123 In other words, if Garner believed that the information 
provided on a tax return was incriminating, Garner could have invoked 
the Fifth Amendment on his tax return.124 Accordingly, Garner was 
never actually compelled to disclose the information.125 Therefore, 
since the government did not deny him an opportunity to refuse to 
answer, he was never compelled to disclose his illegal activity.126  
The Court further explained that Section 7203’s requirement for 
“willfulness” provided taxpayers with sufficient protection, even 
without precompliance review.127 Importantly, the Court noted that the 
willfulness requirement effectively prohibited the government from 
prosecuting a taxpayer for making an invalid claim of privilege in good 
faith.128 But the concurring justices disagreed.129 Justice Marshall 
found that the willfulness requirement did not totally afford the 
protection that the Fifth Amendment provides.130 Nevertheless, the 
majority reasoned that lack of precompliance review would not injure 
a taxpayer who made a good-faith claim of privilege, whether valid or 
invalid.131 
Therefore, since taxpayers have an opportunity to raise the Fifth 
Amendment and not provide incriminating information, and Section 
7203 broadens Fifth Amendment protection by requiring willfulness, 
the Court held that precompliance review is not constitutionally 
required for taxpayers who invoke the Fifth Amendment.132 
 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 656-65. 
 123. Id. at 657. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 665. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at 663. 
 128. Id. at 663 n.18. 
 129. Id. at 667-68 (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment). 
 130. Id. (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment). 
 131. Id. at 663 n.18. 
 132. Id. at 665. 
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IV. DISCUSSION 
The government should afford taxpayers the opportunity for 
precompliance review to allow taxpayers with illegally-earned income 
to test the validity of their Fifth Amendment claims. While 
implementing precompliance review might seem burdensome for the 
government, affording taxpayers precompliance review would not 
rework the Court’s Fifth Amendment jurisprudence or dismantle the 
IRS’s existing procedures. After all, the opportunity for precompliance 
review is afforded and recognized in many other legal spaces. 
Nevertheless, the government does not extend precompliance review 
to taxpayers, even though there is no compelling reason for such 
inconsistency. First, judicial witnesses are afforded the opportunity of 
precompliance review under the Fifth Amendment.133 Second, 
precompliance review is not exclusive to the Fifth Amendment when 
combatting the potential of governmental overreach. The Court in 
Patel extended this opportunity for precompliance review to 
individuals questioning the reasonableness of a search and seizure 
under the Fourth Amendment.134 Finally, the IRS already has its own 
system of quasi-precompliance review through PLRs. Overall, 
precompliance review is not new to modern criminal procedure, nor is 
it new to the tax world. Therefore, the government should offer 
precompliance review to taxpayers who invoke the Fifth Amendment 
on their tax returns. 
This Section demonstrates three ways that the government can 
extend the opportunity for precompliance review to taxpayers. 
Importantly, the government can successfully afford taxpayers 
precompliance review by applying any one of the three proposals. 
First, Part A explains how the government could reconsider Garner 
and ultimately hold that taxpayers who earn gross income through 
illegal activity are compelled to incriminate themselves. Next, Part B 
demonstrates how the government could use recent Fourth 
Amendment precedent in Patel to conclude that taxpayers have a 
constitutional right to precompliance review. Finally, Part C 
demonstrates how the government could provide taxpayers an 
opportunity for precompliance review, even without judicial 
declaration.  
 
 133. Id. at 664. 
 134. See City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 576 U.S. 409, 419 (2015). 
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A. Rethinking Compulsion 
A taxpayer does not have a free choice to refuse to provide 
information on a tax return just because the taxpayer may invoke the 
Fifth Amendment. The Court in Garner concluded that the taxpayer 
was not compelled to incriminate himself because he had a “free 
choice to admit, to deny, or refuse to answer.”135 In other words, the 
taxpayer had the ability to refuse to answer by making a valid claim of 
privilege.136 But this conclusion is drawn from a flawed assumption—
that a taxpayer will always bring a valid claim. 
Taxpayers must be extremely confident in their Fifth Amendment 
claims, whereas witnesses in judicial proceedings do not need to be. If 
a judicial witness invokes a Fifth Amendment protection claim, the 
court can test it, and if the court finds the claim invalid, the witness 
can reconsider it before facing penalties for noncompliance.137 A 
taxpayer, on the other hand, is not afforded the same privilege; the 
taxpayer must make an informed guess about the strength of the claim 
and hope that a court agrees, because if a court holds that the taxpayer’s 
claim is invalid, the government can prosecute the taxpayer for tax 
evasion, without giving the taxpayer an opportunity to reconsider.138 
The risk required to invoke the Fifth Amendment contradicts 
Garner’s ruling that taxpayers have the freedom to refuse to answer. 
In Garner, the Court explained that compulsion exists where there is a 
factor that prevents a taxpayer from claiming the privilege.139 
Importantly, since a serious risk exists when invoking the Fifth 
Amendment on a tax return, a taxpayer could ultimately be better off 
by not invoking the Fifth Amendment and risking federal prosecution. 
In other words, the possibility of prosecution for tax evasion could be 
a factor that prevents a taxpayer from invoking the Fifth Amendment. 
A hypothetical is necessary to illustrate this. 
Suppose Andrew, an Ohio citizen, wagered an online bet on a 
professional baseball game and won $100. Andrew would then be 
required to report the $100 on his tax return. Reporting the source of 
the income, however, would be evidence that Andrew violated state 
law forbidding online sports betting.140 Andrew would likely prevail 
in court if he invoked Fifth Amendment protection on his tax return. 
Nevertheless, the ramifications would be severe if a court rejected his 
 
 135. Garner, 424 U.S. at 657 (quoting Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 241 (1941)). 
 136. Id. at 663. 
 137. Id. at 664. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 654 n.9. 
 140. 29 O.R.C. § 2915.02 (2020). 
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claim of privilege, since the government could prosecute him under 
federal law for tax evasion. Generally, individuals have different levels 
of risk aversion, but it is safe to assume most reasonable people do not 
want to risk violating federal law, even if it meant being convicted for 
a state law misdemeanor. Therefore, suppose Andrew decided to not 
risk conviction for tax evasion and reported the earnings from his 
illegal bet. Under Garner’s definition of compulsion, Andrew was 
compelled, because here, a factor existed that kept Andrew from 
claiming the privilege. 
The requirement for “willfulness” under Section 7203 is insufficient 
in affording taxpayers Fifth Amendment protection. The Court 
explained in Garner that the willfulness requirement does provide 
taxpayers some protection if a taxpayer’s claim is invalid.141 Indeed, 
due to the willfulness element, a good faith claim, even if invalid, 
could entitle the taxpayer to acquittal.142 Nevertheless, even this 
broadened protection still falls short of adequately protecting 
taxpayers.143 Importantly, even the concurring justices recognized that 
with the willfulness requirement, taxpayers still face a risk of criminal 
penalty when invoking the Fifth Amendment.144 Therefore, the Court 
in Garner should have found the willfulness requirement insufficient 
and instead afforded taxpayers the opportunity for precompliance 
review. 
The Court should overrule Garner and hold that taxpayers are 
compelled to disclose illegally-earned income. Not only did the Court 
underappreciate the risk that taxpayers entertain to invoke the Fifth 
Amendment, but the Court also overestimated the effect of Section 
7203’s requirement for willfulness. Therefore, the Court should 
overrule Garner and establish that the Fifth Amendment requires 
precompliance review for taxpayers. 
B. The Intersectionality of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments  
The relationship between the Fourth and Fifth Amendments has not 
 
 141. Garner, 424 U.S. at 663 n.18. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Camara v. Municipal Court of City and County of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 533 (1967) 
(“Broad statutory safeguards are no substitute for individualized review, particularly when those 
safeguards may only be invoked at the risk of a criminal penalty.”). 
 144. Garner, 424 U.S. at 667-68 (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment) (“It is one thing to deny a 
good-faith defense to a witness who is given a prompt ruling on the validity of his claim of privilege and 
an opportunity to reconsider his refusal to testify before subjecting himself to possible punishment for 
contempt. It would be quite another to deny a good-faith defense to someone like petitioner, who may be 
denied a ruling on the validity of his claim of privilege until his criminal prosecution, when it is too late 
to reconsider.”) (internal citations omitted). 
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gone unnoticed. In Boyd v. United States, the Court asserted that there 
is an “intimate relation” between the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.145 
Further, the Court explained that they “throw great light on each other” 
since the reason for prohibiting unlawful searches and seizures is to 
prevent the government from compelling citizens to release evidence 
that would incriminate themselves.146 This view of the relationship 
between the Fourth Amendment and the Fifth Amendment has 
evolved, and in some respects, has been criticized.147 Nevertheless, 
there still exists an acknowledged penumbra of the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments—that the government cannot unreasonably retrieve 
information from its citizens.148  
The strikingly similar situations in Patel and Garner are evidence 
that the Fourth and Fifth Amendments cannot be seen as completely 
distinct. In Patel, the statute compelled hotel owners to turn over their 
records whenever requested by the government.149 Similarly, Section 
7203 compels taxpayers to file a tax return, which includes properly 
calculating gross income and reporting income earned through illegal 
activity.150  Also, under the statute in Patel, a hotel owner who refused 
to comply with the search could be “arrested on the spot.”151 Similarly, 
a taxpayer who refuses to file a tax return can be prosecuted under 
Section 7203.152 However, not all searches, seizures, and required 
disclosures are constitutional; therefore, hotel owners may want to 
contest the reasonableness of a search from the Patel statute, and 
taxpayers may want to contest whether certain disclosures on their tax 
returns would incriminate them. Nevertheless, hotel owners would 
likely not prevail every time they contested a search. Therefore, hotel 
owners would have to weigh the likelihood of the Fourth Amendment 
claim against the severity of the prosecution for failing to comply. The 
Court in Patel, however, concluded that hotel owners could not 
“reasonably be put to this kind of choice,” and therefore, 
 
 145. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 633 (1886). 
 146. Id. 
 147. United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 618 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring). (“Several of Boyd’s 
express or implicit declarations [had] not stood the test of time.”) 
 148. See, e.g., Michael S. Pardo, Disentangling the Fourth Amendment and the Self-Incrimination 
Clause, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1857 (2005). This type of argument has been accepted by the Court. See, e.g., 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 318 U.S. 479, 486 (1965). In fact, the argument here takes fewer leaps than the 
argument in Griswold. Under Griswold, the Court held that the entire Bill of Rights had a penumbra of 
privacy, whereas this argument suggests simply that the two Amendments have the same goal. In other 
words, the argument that a penumbra exists in the Fourth and Fifth Amendment is significantly narrower 
than the argument that was accepted by the Court in Griswold. 
 149. City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 576 U.S. 409, 413 (2015). 
 150. Garner, 424 U.S. at 651; 26 U.S.C. § 7203 (2020). 
 151. Patel, 576 U.S. at 421. 
 152. Garner, 424 U.S. at 651; 26 U.S.C. § 7203 (2020). 
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precompliance review was necessary for the law to be 
constitutional.153 Therefore, since the facts are nearly identical in Patel 
and Garner, the Court could apply the reasoning in Patel to hold that 
precompliance review is constitutionally required for taxpayers. 
The Garner Court did not value the risk of invoking the Fifth 
Amendment, similar to how a high-risk gambler does not value the risk 
in making wagers. In other words, when a wild gambler considers a 
bet, all the gambler can think about is, “This bet is great, because if I 
win, I’ll be rich!” On the other hand, the Patel Court viewed the risk 
of invoking the Fifth Amendment as a risk-averse gambler would view 
a bet. Generally, a reasonable gambler recognizes the rewarding result 
of a winning bet, but also appreciates the inherent risk. Consequently, 
the Patel Court ruled that citizens should not have to flip a coin to see 
if their constitutional rights would prevail, when one side of the coin 
is prosecution under federal law. Nevertheless, the Garner Court 
essentially concluded that no risk existed, since the taxpayer could 
prevail after invoking Fifth Amendment privilege. Simply put, the 
Patel Court appreciated the inherent risk, and the Garner Court did 
not.  
The reasoning of Patel should be used as a foundation for why 
courts should afford taxpayers precompliance review. While not 
precedent for Fifth Amendment cases, the Court could apply the 
reasoning in Patel to the next taxpayer who comes before the Court in 
Garner’s shoes. Using Patel, the Court would not have to expressly 
overrule Garner. However, applying the reasoning in Patel would 
likely make Garner no longer relevant because it would establish a 
new standard, which would make precompliance review 
constitutionally required, like Patel did for searches and seizures. 
C. Precompliance Review From the IRS 
Using PLRs as a means of precompliance review could allow 
taxpayers to have the same protection without requiring a change in 
the Court’s Fifth Amendment jurisprudence. The IRS does not have 
the power to say what is and what is not a valid exercise of privilege, 
but the IRS could assure taxpayers that it would not pursue litigation 
against them for invoking the Fifth Amendment. Garner explained that 
when a taxpayer claims the Fifth Amendment, the IRS is able to 
proceed in two ways: (1) the IRS can attempt to prosecute the taxpayer 
for tax evasion, or (2) the IRS can complete the tax returns 
 
 153. Patel, 576 U.S. at 421. 
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administratively without the incriminatory information.154 But, under 
this proposal, the IRS would proceed in a third way: the IRS would 
advise taxpayers that it would or would not commence litigation 
against them. In other words, the IRS would either notify taxpayers 
that it does not consider their claims valid, in which case the taxpayers 
would have to file a return, or the IRS would notify taxpayers that it 
considers their claims valid, in which case the taxpayers would make 
an undisclosed tax payment and be relieved from filing a return.155 
Consequently, this solution would satisfy both the interests of the IRS 
and the interests of taxpayers; the approach would protect taxpayers 
from facing a risk when invoking the Fifth Amendment, and the 
approach would still enable the IRS to receive tax revenue. 
A PLR is not the same as a judicial opinion, but a PLR could 
function similarly to a judicial opinion. Like a judicial opinion, 
taxpayers could rely on the validity of PLRs to determine whether their 
claims were valid. In other words, if the IRS determined that a 
taxpayer’s Fifth Amendment claim was valid, the IRS could not “bait 
and switch” and commence litigation against the taxpayer for tax 
evasion since PLRs are binding on the IRS.156 Indeed, the primary 
purpose of PLRs is to promote “sound tax administration” by 
providing clarity to taxpayers, benefitting both the taxpayer and the 
government.157 Overall, PLRs would have the same practical effect for 
taxpayers as a judicial opinion. Therefore, the government could use 
PLRs to offer taxpayers precompliance review. 
D. Implementation 
Offering precompliance review would not impede the government 
from exercising its taxing power. Some might argue that affording 
taxpayers greater constitutional protection would hinder the 
government from collecting taxes. But that skepticism would be 
shortsighted. Importantly, filing a tax return is not necessary for the 
IRS to receive the tax payment; the act of filing a tax return and 
 
 154. Garner, 424 U.S. at 651. Under I.R.C. § 6020, if a taxpayer does not complete part of the 
return, the Secretary has the authority to “make such return from his own knowledge or from such 
information as he can obtain through testimony or otherwise.”  
 155. See Stanley, supra note 6, at 558 (explaining that even taxpayers with valid claims would still 
have to submit a separate tax payment). But the government would have to amend these specific PLRs to 
not be made public via the Freedom of Information Act. 
 156. Understanding IRS Guidance – A Brief Primer, IRS, 
https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/understanding-irs-guidance-a-brief-
primer#:~:text=A%20PLR%20is%20issued%20in,other%20taxpayers%20or%20IRS%20personnel 
[https://perma.cc/Q5UT-CH7C] (last visited Nov. 30, 2020). 
 157. 26 C.F.R. § 601.201 (2020). 
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submitting a tax payment are two separate acts.158 Therefore, the 
government’s taxing power would not be undermined by relieving a 
taxpayer from filing a tax return since the taxpayer could still pay the 
tax in an undisclosed payment.159 Further, offering precompliance 
review would not invite frivolous claims. Either way the government 
implemented precompliance review, the opportunity would not 
guarantee a taxpayer victory, because a taxpayer’s claim would still 
have to either survive judicial scrutiny or the IRS’s judgment of the 
validity of a Fifth Amendment claim.160 Also, accessing 
precompliance review would not be without cost since a taxpayer 
would have to undergo administrative fees to properly obtain review, 
such as attorney’s fees and filing fees. Consequently, only taxpayers 
who truly believed that their contentions were valid would seek 
precompliance review.161 
In sum, the government has a multitude of ways to implement 
precompliance review. To afford taxpayers precompliance review, the 
Court could overrule Garner; the Court could apply the reasoning in 
Patel; or the IRS or Congress could allow taxpayers to test their claims 
through a PLR. Importantly, implementing precompliance review for 
taxpayers seeking to invoke the Fifth Amendment would not require 
reinventing the wheel by any means. Minimally, it should be clear that 
precompliance review is available in many situations, and it makes 
sense to make it available to taxpayers in the same regard. This Article 
does not endorse a specific means of implementing precompliance 
review, although given its relevance, extending precompliance review 
from the reasoning in Patel would likely be the avenue that the Court 
would take. Nevertheless, the methods would likely not produce 
substantively different outcomes. 
Administrative efficiency would be the biggest roadblock in 
implementing precompliance review. PLRs are great in theory, but 
they are very expensive for the IRS to issue.162 Therefore, the IRS has 
a very narrow scope of the kinds of requests for which it will issue 
PLRs.163 Consequently, in 2018, the IRS only issued 802 PLRs.164 
Moreover, implementing judicial precompliance review could result in 
judicial backlog. Therefore, the government would need to be very 
strategic in implementing precompliance review for taxpayers. 
 
 158. Stanley, supra note 6, at 543. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. at 559. 
 161. Id. 
 162. McMahon, supra note 106. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. at 246. 
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Despite the administrative burden, precompliance review should 
still be explored. First, the cost of PLRs could be worth the benefit of 
more taxpayers complying with the IRS. PLRs benefit the IRS because 
they promote compliance; therefore, the government investing in 
expanding PLRs could result in even greater tax revenue for the IRS. 
Second, if precompliance review is understood as a constitutional 
right, administrative convenience should not be given as weighty of 
consideration. After all, when the Court in Patel established that 
precompliance review was a right, the Court did not inquire about the 
administrative burden of implementing precompliance review. Finally, 
the number of claims for precompliance review would not likely be 
overwhelming because the taxpayers who have both earned illegal 
income and believe that they have a valid claim of Fifth Amendment 
privilege are likely few and far between.165 Therefore, even though the 
administrative burden might be high, the government would benefit by 
the gained revenue from taxpayers who would otherwise not comply 
with the IRS. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The government should offer taxpayers the opportunity for 
precompliance review. Because of the risk of prosecution for tax 
evasion under an invalid claim, taxpayers might choose not to invoke 
Fifth Amendment protection. Therefore, the Court should revisit 
Garner and hold that taxpayers are compelled to incriminate 
themselves like judicial witnesses and are thus entitled to 
precompliance review. Revisiting Garner is not the only avenue for 
the Court to afford taxpayers with precompliance review. In a recent 
Fourth Amendment case with similar facts as Garner, the Court held 
that precompliance review was constitutionally required. Since the 
Fourth and Fifth Amendments seek to accomplish the same goal, the 
Court could apply the reasoning in Patel to find precompliance review 
necessary under the Fifth Amendment. Taxpayers do not need to rely 
on the judicial branch for precompliance review. The IRS already has 
a system for preliminary rulings that could be extended to taxpayers. 
Therefore, by using PLRs, the IRS could allow taxpayers to obtain 
precompliance review. Further research should be devoted to 
determining the most efficient way to afford taxpayers precompliance 
review and what such implementation would look like. 
The mere ability to claim the Fifth Amendment on a tax return is not 
sufficient constitutional protection. Underneath the fig leaf of an 
 
 165. Stanley, supra note 6, at 559. 
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opportunity to invoke constitutional protection lies a very serious risk 
that taxpayers must undergo to invoke their privilege. Because of the 
risk, the government gets two bites of the apple. In other words, the 
government can either hope that the taxpayer is too risk averse to 
invoke the privilege, or the government can hope that when the 
taxpayer invokes the privilege, the government can prosecute the 
taxpayer for tax evasion. Therefore, taxpayers should be able to have 
an opportunity for precompliance review so that they do not face such 
a risk. Otherwise, the government will still be able to keep playing 
“Heads I win, Tails you lose.” 
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